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THE SCIENTER REQUIREMENT IN ACTIONS
UNDER RULE 10b-5t
DAVID G. EPSTEIN*
More than twenty years have now elapsed since a private right of
action under rule 10b-5 1 was first recognized judicially. In the interim,
rule lOb-5 has become "the most prolific source of litigation since Henry
Ford invented the flivver. ' '2 And, the Rule is assuming even greater im-
portance. Private actions under 10b-5 in excess of seventy-seven million
dollars have been instituted against Texas Gulf Sulphur and its officers
and directors. The Securities and Exchange Commission proposals to
implement the Wheat Report will result in an increased emphasis on
10b-5.1 Notwithstanding the importance of rule lOb-5 and the numerous
reported decisions5 and legal writings devoted to it and its nuances,
t The awkwardness of entitling a study of a specific element of a cause of action
under a rule promulgated pursuant to a section of one of several federal securities
laws brings to mind the remark of Lord Devlin:
Composing a title for an address is sometimes just as difficult as composing
the address itself. I wish that a legal composer was given the same freedom
on this point as a musical composer. He can write what he likes and can
call it a Sonata in F minor, or a Suite for Strings and Timpani-or, if he
considers himself very famous, just Devlin in G.
P. DEVLIN, SAMPLES OF LAWMAKING 104 (1962).
* Member of Arizona and Texas Bars; Associate in the firm of Streich, Lang,
Weeks, Cardon & French, Phoenix, Arizona.
117 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1969). Rule 10b-5 was promulgated by the Securities
and Exchange Commission under the enabling authority of § 10 (b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1964). The rule provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
2 Bangs, Ride 10b-5 and the South Dakota Lawyer, 14 S.D.L. REv. 56, 79
(1969).
See Knauss, Disclosure Requirements-Changing Concepts of Liability, 24
Bus. LAWYER 43, 53 (1968).
' SEC, PROPOSALS TO IMPLEMENT THE WHEAT REPORT (CCH Special Rep.
No. 272, 1969).
' Decisions involving rule lOb-5 are mainly on the pleadings. As Professor
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serious questions remain largely unanswered, particularly with regard
to the elements of a private action under the Rule.' This article will treat
one such question: the role of scienter in a private action under rule
10b-5 for misrepresentations in the sale of securities.
I. TaE MEANING OF SCIENTER
It is first necessary to ascribe some meaning to the term "scienter" as
used herein. There is a substantial amount of Lewis G. Carroll's
Humpty-Dumpty in all of us.7 Everyone-especially appellate court
judges and contributors to legal periodicals-has the tendency to define
terms arbitrarily. As a result, numerous definitions have been given
the term "scienter" as used in connection with fraud. As Professor Loss
has observed:
[Scienter] . . . has been variously defined to mean everything from
knowing falsity with an implication of mens rea, through the various
gradations of recklessness, down to such non-action as is virtually
equivalent to negligence or even liability without fault .... 8
In an effort to avoid succumbing to the Humpty-Dumpty syndrome,
scienter shall here be defined by illustration rather than in the abstract.
Dean Keeton has isolated the several possible states of mind of a
party making a misstatement into five more or less separate classes: a
person makes a misrepresenation (1) justifiably convinced of the truth
of the statement, or (2) believing in the truth of the statement but
knowing that he has insufficient knowledge on which to base such a
belief, or (3) having no genuine belief whatsoever in either the truth or
the falsity of the statement, or (4) realizing that the statement was
probably false, or (5) convinced of the falsity of the statement.9 For
Bromberg has stated: "[T]he typical IOb-5 'victory' is only a holding that a
cause of action has been stated, good enough to withstand a motion to dismiss."
A. BROMBERG, SEcURITIEs LAW: FRAUD § 1.3(2) (1967) [hereinafter cited as
BROmBERG].
'Professor Hamilton is much more emphatic on this point: "The case law
arising under Rule 10b-5 is in a chaotic mess." Hamilton, Book Review, 46 TEXAS
L. REv. 815 (1968).
" "When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, "it
means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less." L. CARROLL, ALIcE'S
ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND AND THROUGH THE LOOxING GLASS 186 (1916).
'3 L. Loss, SEcupaTIES REGULATION 1432 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as
Loss].
o Keeton, Fraud: The Necessity for an Intent to Deceive, 5 U.C.L.A.L. REv.
583, 589 (1958).
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purposes of this paper "intentional" describes Class Five; the term
"scienter" encompasses Classes Three, Four, and Five. Class Two is
"negligence," and Class One is "innocent."
II. CASES CONSIDERING SCIENTER IN 10b-5 ACTIONS
Since the courts "created" the private action under rule 10b-5' 0 and
extended this remedy to buyers as well as sellers, 1 it seems only proper
to look first to judicial interpretation in deciding the role of scienter in a
private action under the Rule. The necessity of proof of scienter in a
private action under rule 10b-5 was first discussed in Fischman v. Ratheon
Manufacturing Co.'2 There the common stockholder-plaintiffs alleged
that they were induced to purchase stock in the defendant corporation
by misstatements and omissions in a prospectus that covered only pre-
ferred stock. Relief was sought under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. The
trial court dismissed, holding that since the buyers' action was based
on allegedly false statements in a prospectus, section 11 of the Securities
Act of 1933 constituted their exclusive remedy. Since relief under
section 11 is limited to those purchasing the stock issue covered by the
prospectus, it was held that the plaintiffs had failed to state a cause of
action.3 The Second Circuit reversed, stating: "[W]hen, to conduct
actionable under § 11 of the 1933 Act, there is added the ingredient of
fraud, then the conduct becomes actionable under § l0b of the 1934 Act
and the Rule . . . ."" The remainder of the opinion affords no guidance
as to the meaning of the phrase "ingredient of fraud."
In Weber v. C.M.P. Corp.,'5 a district court defined this phrase as
meaning "knowledge of the falsity of the alleged untrue statements."' 0
The definition is consistent with the interpretation attributed to Fischman
by most courts and legal writers and with the present day concept of
1 0Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). See
generally Dykstra, Civil Liability Under Rde 10b-5, 1967 UTAH L. REV. 207,
209-11.
"
1See Fischman v. Ratheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 786-88 (2d Cir. 1951);
BROMBERG § 2.4(2) ; 3 Loss 7778-91.
' 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
1 8Fischman v. Ratheon Mfg. Co., 9 F.R.D. 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). The court
made mention of section 12(2) of the 1933 Act but seems to have ignored its
availability.
14 188 F.2d at 787 (emphasis added).
'- 242 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). The court went on to question, but none-
theless to follow, the Fischman formulation.
"I Id. at 323.
[Vol. 48
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the term "fraud."' "T Although cases allowing recovery for negligent
misrepresentation are sometimes referred to as "fraud" cases,"' the pre-
vailing view is that they are grounded in a theory of recovery separate
and distinct from fraud. 9
Fischn n has received little judicial acceptance. While several
New York district court decisions have followed it,"0 only one court out-
side the Second Circuit, the district court of Colorado, can be said
to have taken a similar position. In Trussell v. United Underwriters,
Ltd.,2 the plaintiffs were stock purchasers seeking damages from the
defendant seller-issuer. The complaint contained five counts, three of
which charged misrepresentations and omissions in violation of rule
10b-5. Of these three, the first merely itemized the misstatements; the
second incorporated the first and added the allegation that the defendants
had full knowledge of the falsity of the representations and of the fact
that plaintiffs would rely upon them; and the third22 charged that the
statements constituted negligent performance by the defendants of their
duty to disclose full, complete, and accurate information. The first and
third counts were dismissed by the district court as insufficient in that
they contained no allegation that the misstatements were made knowingly
or intentionally.2" In dictum, the court explained its concept of knowingly
or intentionally as including a representation made with reckless dis-
regard of the truth or falsity.2
" See, e.g., R. JENNINGS & H. MAnR, SECURITIES REGULATION CASES AND
MATERIAILS 866-67 (2d ed. 1968); Comment, Securities Regulation--Fraud in
Securities Transactions and Rde lOb-5-A Survey of Selected Current Problems,
46 N.C.L. REv. 599, 623-25 (1968). But see E. GADsBY, FEDERAL SEcURITIES
AcT OF 1934 § 5.03[1][d] (1967).
"' E.g., Bobby Jones Garden Apts., Inc. v. Suleski, 391 F.2d 172, 177 (5th Cir.
1968), quoting from Kutner v. Kalish, 173 So. 2d 763 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
• See W. PRosSER, LAw OF TORTS § 102, at 720 (3d ed. 1964).
See Globus v. Law Research Serv. Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188, 197-98 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) (something more than a negligent misstatement); Gould v. Tricon, Inc.,
272 F. Supp. 385, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (proof of fraudulent conduct essential);
Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538, 553 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (intent to
defraud or guilty knowledge) (dictum); Webber v. C.M.P. Corp., 242 F. Supp. 321,
325 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (deception in the sense of cheating).2 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964).
"
2 This was actually the plaintiffs' fourth claim; their third claim alleged viola-
tion of the state blue sky law. For a discussion of the problem of pendent juris-
diction posed by this claim, see 40 WASH. L. REv. 352 (1965).
. 228 F. Supp. at 773-74.
2 Id. at 772. Accordingly, it would seem that in Colorado, as well as in states
within the Second Circuit, only misrepresentations made with a state of mind
coming within Classes Three, Four, or Five of Dean Keeton's classification of
misstatements would give rise to private actions under rule lob-5.
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The precedential value of Trussell today is somewhat questionable. In
Stevens v. Vowell,25 the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which
includes Colorado, stated:
It is not necessary to allege or prove common law fraud to make out
a case under the statute and rule. It is only necessary to prove one
of the prohibited actions such as the material misstatement of fact or
the omission to state a material fact.26
Then in Parker v. Baltimore Paint & Chemical Corp.,"' the Colorado
district court found the above language to be dictum and reaffirmed the
requirement for scienter imposed by Trussell.28 The facts of Stevens give
support to this finding. There the defendants had represented that the
entire amount of the investment would be used for the construction of
Arro-Triever archery lanes in Utah; the defendants in fact had no con-
nection with the actual owner of Arro-Triever and no such lanes were
ever built. These facts permit at least in inference of fraud, and the
plaintiff's complaint so alleged.
There is also a line of cases supporting the position that scienter is
not required by rule 10b-5; the leading one is Ellis v. Carter.2 In it, as
in Fischman, a buyer sought to recover for allegedly fraudIulent mis-
representations under rule lOb-5. As in Fischman, the defendants con-
tended that rule 10b-5 affords no right of recovery to defrauded buyers,
and the contention was rejected by the court.3 But unlike the Second
Circuit, the court in Ellis, in rejecting this contention, stated that a show-
ing of common law fraud is not essential to the establishment of a cause
of action under 10b-5.31 There is language in the opinion indicating that
even innocent misrepresentations may be a basis for recovery under the
Rule, 2 and Ellis has been read in such a manner by several legal writers.33
No court has actually held that liability will attach for a misrepresentation
that is neither negligent nor intentional although there is language in sev-
eral cases other than Ellis that would seem to support such a holding.3'
25343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965).
26 Id. at 379.2 244 F. Supp. 267 (D. Colo. 1965).
"Id. at 270.9 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961).
201d. at 273-74.
31 Id. at 275 n.5.
2 2 1d. at 274.6. See BROMBERG § 8.9 n.102; R. JENNINGs & H. MARSH, supra note 17, at 866-
67.
*E.g., Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 212 (9th Cir. 1962) ;
[Vol. 48
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Ellis has received as little judicial recognition as Fischman. While
several courts have indicated by means of dictum their approval of
the position on scienter taken in Ellis,as only one district court can be said
to have based a decision on that case. In Hendricks v. Flato Realty
Investments,"6 a federal district court relied on Ellis to reject a motion
to dismiss an action for alleged misrepresentations in the sale of securities
based on rule 10b-5 even though the complaint failed to allege scienter.
The decision contains no discussion of the reasons for following Ellis;
the court simply stated: "This court feels that the logical approach of
Ellis has much to be recommended in a situation of this nature and I am
persuaded to follow it." 7
In Drake v. Thor Power Tool Co., 8 an Illinois district court took
still a third position. Plaintiff Drake alleged that he had purchased stock
in reliance on false figures in Thor's financial statements and that de-
fendant accounting firm had failed to exercise proper and appropriate
auditing procedures in examining the financial statements and in rendering
its opinion that the statements fairly represented the financial position of
Thor. No charge having been made that it knew of the alleged mis-
representations in the financial statements, defendant accounting firm,
contending inter alia that knowledge is a necessary element of a claim
under rule l0b-5, 9 moved to dismiss. The court rejected both the
rationale of Ellis" and the defendant's contention and construed the
allegation of improper auditing procedures as an allegation of negli-
gence.41 The court held that negligent as well as intentional misrepre-
sentations are within the ambit of rule l0b-5.42
This position was apparently adopted by the majority in SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.' The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Bond Co., 187 F. Supp. 14, 23 (W.D.
Ky. 1960), rev'd on other grounds sub non., Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v.
Dunne, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962).
"Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 734-35 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 951 (1968); Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374, 379-80 (10th Cir. 1965);
Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 1963).
" [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. RElP. 92,290 (S.D. Tex.
1968).
7 id. 92,290 at 97,388.
282 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. II. 1967).
"Brief for Defendant, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., at 8, Drake v. Thor
Power Tool Co., 282 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
'o 282 F. Supp. at 102.
,Id. at 104.
"Id. at 105.
" 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
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in deciding this case cited both Fischman and Ellis in support of the
proposition that negligent misrepresentations or omissions are actionable
under rule 10b-5:
In an enforcement proceeding for equitable or prophylactic relief, the
common law standard of deceptive conduct has been modified in
the interests of broader protection for the investing public so that
negligent insider conduct has become unlawful. A similar standard has
been adopted in private actions...
: . . [TJhis position is not . . . irreconcilable with previous language
in this circuit because "some form of the traditional scienter require-
ment" . . . Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., . . . is preserved. This
requirement, whether it be termed lack of diligence, constructive fraud,
or unreasonable or negligent conduct, remains implicit in this standard,
a standard that promotes the deterrence objective of the Rule.44
As the above discussion indicates, this interpretation is at best a some-
what loose reading of Ellis and Fischman. To compound the confusion,
the majority later in its opinion indicated that good faith will be a
defense to a private action instituted under rule lOb-5 for misrepresentation
in the purchase or sale of securities:
It seems clear, however, that if corporate management demonstrates
that it was diligent in ascertaining that the information it published
was the whole truth and that such diligently obtained information
was disseminated in good faith, rule lOb-5 would not have been
violated.4 5
Further, the concurring opinions express reservations about imposing
civil liability for negligence.46
Coupling these observations with the fact that Texas Gvlf Sulphur
involved governmental enforcement rather than a private action, it seems
clear that the decision affords no real answer to the scienter question.
This conclusion is borne out by the subsequent decisions that contain
discussions of the language of Texas Gulf Sulphur. The majority of
the courts in these cases recognize scienter as an element in a private
action under the Rule, but are not specific as to the degree of scienter.47
"Id. at 854-55.
'DId. at 862.
'
6 Id. at 866, 868, 869.
" See, e.g., Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969);
Ruszkowski v. Hugh Johnson & Co., Inc., 302 F. Supp. 1371 (W.D.N.Y. 1969);
[Vol. 48
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The following excerpt from Astor v. Texas Gulf Sulphur48 is repre-
sentative:
While some degree of scienter is required, "the trend is clearly
away from enforcing a scienter requirement equal to the 'intent to
defraud' required for common law fraud." Globus v. Law Research
Service [418 F.2d at 1291]. What degree is necessary, whether
it is "actual knowledge of falsity," Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909,
914 (2d Cir. 1968), or "recklessness ... equivalent to wilful fraud,"
S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, . . . is not entirely clear. Until the
"great debate over ordinary negligence versus scienter in private
actions under 10(b) and Rule lOb-5," Globus v. Law Research Ser-
vice [418 F.2d at 1291], is resolved, this court will adhere to the most
recent views expressed by this Circuit, that plaintiffs must show more
than that the April 12 press release was negligently prepared. They
must show some degree of scienter.49
Professor Bromberg has stated the view that the trend in case law
is very much against requiring scienter in a private action under rule
10b-5 ;1o a writer in the North Carolina Law Review has observed a con-
trary development taking place. 1 With due respect to both, it seems in-
accurate to view these few decisions as representing any sort of trend. In
most circuits, the necessity of alleging and proving a particular state of
mind in a rule 10b-5 action has not even been discussed by way of dictum.
Thus, as Professors Jennings and Marsh have observed, any trend as
to the necessity of proving scienter in a 10b-5 action "would appear to be
largely in the eye of the beholder."5
Legal writers are as divided on the question of what the "law" should
be 3 as they are on the question of what the present state of the law is.
To mention but a few of the ideas that have recently appeared: Professor
Gerstel v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1969). But cf.
Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 7 92,494 (D. Utah
Oct. 17, 1969) (civil liability imposed with no discussion of elements of private
action).
" 306 F. Supp. 1333 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
1 Id. at 1343-44.
5
oBROMBERG § 2.6(1).
Comment, Securities Regulation--Fraud in Securities Transactions and Rule
lOb-5-A Survey of Selected Current Problems, 46 N.C.L. REv. 599, 625 (1968).
52 R. JENNINGS & H. MARSHa, supra note 17, at 866-67 n.6.
'8 The shorthand phrase "what the 'law' should be" is perhaps misleading. Many
legal commentators favor the replacement of lOb-5 with a comprehensive provision
for civil liability. See Henkel, Codification--Civil Liability Under the Federal
Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAWYER, 866 (1967). The views surveyed in the text,
however, refer to the role of scienter in rule lOb-5 in its present form.
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Meisenholder advocates requiring scienter;54 Professor Jennings agrees
except when plaintiff and defendant were in a fiduciary-type relation-
ship ;" Professor Loss would require at least "watered down scienter" ;co
Professor Israels would extend liability to include negligent misrepre-
sentation ;57 and most recently Professor Ruder has proposed a variable
standard of state of mind dependent upon privity, trading, and whether
the gravamen of the complaint is misrepresentation or merely nondis-
closure.5
8
As the cases and commentators provide no clear answer to the role
of scienter in private actions under rule 10b-5, it is necessary to examine
the Rule in light of recognized constructional principles.
III. CONSTRUCTIONAL ARGUMENTS
The construction of a statute or rule is, at best, an inexact art.
Professor Newman has stated:
[T]he cases lack consistency. The Court at times stresses words; at
times, intent. Maxims of construction compete with considerations
of policy ... The issues have been so scattered that we cannot even
detect trends.5 9
There is, however, agreement that the initial step in the constructional
process is an examination of the language of the rule itself.00
A. Language of the Rule
Professor Painter has observed that "[t]he fertility of rule 10b-5
lies in its potential to prohibit as much as possible while saying as little
5 Meisenholder, Scienter and Reliance as Elements in Buyer's Snit Against
Seller Under Rude 1OB-5, 4 CoRP. PRAc. CoMm. 27 (Feb. 1963). Accord, M. Katz
& D. Schwartz, Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5, in PLI, SEC PROBLEMS (1967);
Note, Proof of Scienter Necessary in a Private Suit Under SEC Anti-Fraud Rde
10b-5, 63 Micr. L. REv. 1070 (1965).5 Jennings, Insider Trading in Corporate Securities: A Survey of Hazards
and Disclosure Obligations Under Rule 10b-5, 62 Nw. U.L. REv. 809, 818 (1968).
"' 3 Loss 1766. Accord, Comment, Securities Regulation: Shareholder Deriva-
tive Actions Against Insiders Under Rule 10b-5, 1966 DUKE L.J. 166, 171-72;
Comment, Private Remedies Available Under Rule 10b-5, 20 Sw. L.J. 620, 621
(1966).
"
7 Israels, Book Review, 77 YALE L.J. 1585, 1593 (1968). Accord, Comment,
Negligent Misrepresentations Under Ride 10b-5, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 824 (1965).
" Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The Second Round: Privity and State of Mind
in Ride 10b-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 423, 444 n.107 (1969).
"Newman, How Courts Interpret Regulations, 35 CALIF. L. Rv. 509, 522
(1947).
" See generally E. CRAwroaD, TRE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES § 164 (1940).
[Vol. 48
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as possible." 0 ' The Rule makes no mention of scienter. It provides that
it shall be unlawful for any person directly or indirectly by use of inter-
state commerce, the mails, or the facilities of a national securities ex-
change:
(a) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mis-
leading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person .... 62
The phrase "to defraud" in clause (a) implies a requirement of sci-
enter. 3 "[O]perate as a fraud or deceit upon any person" in clause (c)
can be similarly read. 4 There is, however, no language in clause (b)
that gives rise to even an implication that scienter may be required.
Because of this interpretation, several legal writers have taken the position
that the scienter requirement differs from clause to clause-that it is
required under clauses (a) and (c), but not under clause (b)." For this
suggestion to have any practical significance, it is necessary that clause
(b) operate in an area separate and distinct from that of clauses (a) and
(c).
The Securities and Exchange Commission regards the clauses as
"mutually supporting rather than mutually exclusive.""6 Similarly, most
courts and commentators have made no effort to distinguish the clauses."
0 1Painter, Book Review, 21 VAND. L. REV. 612 (1968).
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1969).
"8 See Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 770 (D. Colo.
1964).
OLW. PAINTER, FEDERAL REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING 230 (1968); 82
1ARv. L. REv. 938, 947 (1969). But see Comment, Negligent Misrepresentations
Under Rule 10b-5, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 824, 826 (1965) (" 'operate as a fraud' em-
phasizes the effect of the conduct rather than the actor's state of mind.")
" See, e.g., Groff, Securities and Exchange Commission v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
-Confidential Information and Insider Trading-Rule 10b-5 Emerges into the
Spotlight, 1966 CoRP. COUNSEL ANN. 242, 252; Note, Rude 10b-5: Elements of a
Private Right of Action, 43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 541, 549, 561 (1968).
"' Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 91& (1961).67E.g., List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 811 (1965); Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th
Cir. 1962) (by implication) ; Comment, Securities Regulation--Fraud in Securities
Transactions and Ride lOb-5-A Survey of Selected Current Problems, 46 N.C.L.
REv. 599, 623-25 (1968) ; Comment, Private Remedies Available Under Rule 10b-5,
20 Sw. L.J. 620, 621 (1966).
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A writer in the University of Chicago Law Review, however, has sug-
gested that since clause (b) speaks more directly to active misrepresenta-
tions, "it should be the principal enforcement clause for such conduct." 68
No court has taken this position, and no reported decision contains any
attempt to distinguish the types of conduct covered only by clause (b)."0
On the contrary, in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.,1° the
Supreme Court took the opposite view in construing the anti-fraud pro-
vision of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, which is worded virtually
the same as clauses (a) and (c) of rule 10b-5. Noting the omission of
a counterpart to clause (b), the Court found that fact to have no
practcial significance72 and labelled "a specific proscription against non-
disclosure surplusage."73
Thus, it would seem that the following conclusions can be drawn from
considering the language of rule 10b-5: (1) the scienter requirement
should be the same for each of the clauses of rule 10b-5, and (2) while
the Rule is ambiguous, there is language that can be construed as re-
quiring some form of scienter.
B. Language of Section lob
To be valid, an administrative regulation must be within the ambit
of the enabling statute. 4 Section 10b of the Securities Exchange Act"
authorizes rules and regulations proscribing "any manipulative or de-
ceptive device." Professor Loss has suggested that this language may
limit the Securities and Exchange Commission's authority under section
10b to the promulgation of rules requiring scienter and that if rule lOb-5
is not so limited, it is ultra vires.76 There is case law supporting this
proposition ;77 however, there is also contrary authority.
"8 Comment, Negligent Misrepresenatations Under Ride lOb-5, 32 U. CHI. L.
REv. 824, 826 (1965). Cf. Daum & Phillips, The Implications of Cady, Roberts,
17 Bus. LAWYER 939, 944-45 (1962).
" Some courts have, however, suggested that total silence may violate only
clauses (a) and (c). See, e.g., Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F.
Supp. 757, 767 (D. Colo. 1964); Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239,
243 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). Accord, 3 Loss 1439.
° 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
7 15 U.S.C. §80b-6(1), (2) (1964).72 3,75 U.S. at 197-99.
73Id. at 199.
7 Yarborough v. Gardner, 283 F. Supp. 814, 821 n.6 (E.D.N.C. 1968).7. 15 U.S.C. 78j (b) (1964).
763 Loss 1766. Accord, 82 HARV. L. REv. 938, 947 (1969).
"E.g., Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538, 553 n.12. (S.D.N.Y. 1967);
Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 772 (D. Colo. 1964).
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In rejecting the proposition, the court in Ellis v. Carter8 emphasized
the word "any":
We see no reason to go beyond the plain meaning of the word 'any,'
indicating that the use of manipulative or deceptive devices or con-
trivances of whatever kind may be forbidden, to construe the statute
as if it read 'any fraudulent' devices.7 9
This reasoning is at best questionable. Granted that "any" manipulative
or deceptive device means manipulative or deceptive devices of whatever
kind,8" the question remains whether every kind of manipulative or decep-
tive device requires scienter.
Professor Meisenholder has reached the same result as the court in
Ellis in a more logical manner by focusing on the word "deceptive" and
defining it to include "misrepresentations and omissions of material facts
which are misleading, no matter how innocently made."8 " Similarly, a
California appellate court in People v. Wahl,s2 in construing a statute pro-
hibiting "deceptive or misleading [advertising],"" replied on a dictionary
definition--"deceptive does not always imply intent to deceive"--to find
no scienter requirement. A writer in the Yale Law Journal has taken the
position that the omission from section 10b of any specific language
requiring intent indicates that conduct may be manipulative or deceptive
without being intentional.8 5
Both lines of authority have ignored a relevant consideration-the
similar language in section 15 (c) (1)6 of the same Act. This subsection
prohibits brokers or dealers from effecting transactions "by means of a
manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device or contrivance." The
word "other" is the key. Such a use of "other" in a statute means that
"8 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961).
70 Id. at 274.
so But see Donohue v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 155 Conn. 550, 556, 235 A.2d
643, 646 (1967) ("any" does not necessarily mean "all' or "every").81 Meisenholder, supra note 54, at 37. Cf. Leavell, The Texas Gulf Sulphur
Opinion in the Appellate Court: An Open Door to Federal Control of Corporations,
3 GA. L. REv. 141, 159 (1968).82 39 Cal. App. 2d 771, 100 P.2d 550 (L.A. County Super. Ct., App. Dept. 1940).
88 Ch. 254, § 1, [1905] Cal. Stat. 227, as amended, ch. 634, § 1, [1915] Cal. Stat.
1027 (repealed 1941).
8139 Cal. App. 2d at 772, 100 P.2d at 551, quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTER-
NATIONAL DIcTIONARY (1938). Webster's Third New International Dictionary
omits any such mention.
85 Note, Civil Liability Under Section 10b-5: A Suggestion for Replacing the
Doctrine of Privity, 74 YALE L.J. 658, 683 (1965).
" 15 U.S.C. 78o(c) (1) (1964).
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the words preceding it are of the same character as the words following
it.87 Thus, "other" indicates that "manipulative" and "deceptive" come
within the meaning of "fraudulent," and, as pointed out above, "fraudu-
lent" is generally regarded as requiring scienter
8
It is a well-recognized principle of statutory construction that when
the same word is used in different parts of the same statute, it will be
presumed to be used in the same sense in each place, at least in the
absence of anything in the statute indicating a contrary intent.8, Accord-
ingly, if 'deceptive" is synonymous with "fraudulent" in section 15, it
should be synonymous with "fraudulent" in section 10.
The language of section 20c of the Investment Advisers Act 0 may
also be relevant. It prohibits conduct that is "fraudulent, deceptive or
manipulative." The use of the disjunctive pronoun "or" seems to indi-
cate that "manipulative" and "deceptive" are different from "fraudu-
lent.""1 The Supreme Court, however, has taken a contrary position;
in construing this provision, the Court said that "manipulative" is no
broader than "fraudulent."'9 2
C. Statuory Tort-"Willfully"
In Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 3 the first case to recognize civil
liability under rule 10b-5, the court relied in part on the statutory tort
theory.94 Under this theory, the violation of a criminal statute results
in civil liability. Rule 10b-5 is not itself a criminal statute; nor is section
10b. There are no provisions for criminal sanctions in either. Section 321r
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, however, does make criminal any
willful violation of any section of the Act or of any rule promulgated
thereunder. Accordingly, a willful violation of rule lOb-5 is a criminal
offense and civil liability can be implied therefrom."
8 E.g., In re Bush Terminal Co., 93 F.2d 659, 660 (2d Cir. 1938) ; Twin Falls
County v. Hulbert, 66 Idaho 128, 140, 156 P.2d 319, 324 (1945).
88 See pp. 484-85 & note 19 supra.8oE.g., United States v. Gertz, 249 F.2d 662, 665 (9th Cir. 1957); Arizona
State Tax Comm'n v. Staggs Realty Corp., 85 Ariz. 294, 298, 337 P.2d 281, 284(1959) (dictum).
15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(4) (1964).
o'But see E. CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES § 188 (1940) ("or"
may mean "and").
8 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963).
869 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
" See generally Note, Implying Civil Remedies from Federal Regulatory
Statutes, 77 HARV. L. REv. 285 (1963).
8 48 Stat. 904 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a) (1964).
""The statutory tort theory is generally used to establish breach of duty in a
[Vol. 48
SCIENTER AND RULE 10b-5
Based on this analysis, it can be argued that civil liability exists only
for willful violations of lOb-5 and that the violation is willful only when
the violator acts with scienter. Such an argument ignores the other basis
for civil liability set out in Kardon;Or more important for present pur-
jposes, it ignores the variety of meanings that have been attributed to
the word "willful." While the majority of courts still define "willful" in
terms such as "with evil intent or malice" or "bad purpose,"9 8 there are
courts that speak of "willful" as meaning "careless disregard"'99 or "reck-
less disregard for the safety of others."100
Even within the limits of the federal securities laws, the meaning of
the word "willful" is far from clear.101 In the very same sentence of
section 32 that contains the word "willfully," the phrase "willfully and
knowingly" appears. This fact would seem to indicate that "willfully"
as used in section 32 means something different from, and less than,
"knowingly." Further, while there has been no reasoned discussion of
"willfully" under section 32, the courts have been liberal in construing
this term in cases arising under other sections of the Securities Acts. In
United States v. Benjamin,10 2 for example, the Second Circuit indicated
that the defendant acted willfully, within the meaning of section 24 of the
Securities Act of 1933, when he "recklessly stated as facts things of which
he was ignorant."' It would thus seem that the Second Circuit would
label the actions of a defendant that fall within Class Three of Dean
negligence action. See W. PRossE, LAw OF ToRTs § 35 (3d ed. 1964). The prin-
,ciple is, however, by no means so limited. See Joseph, Civil Liability Under
Ride lOb-5-A Reply, 59 Nw. U.L. Ruv. 171, 172-74 (1964). But cf. Ruder,
Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5: Jvdicial Revision of Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw.
1J.L. REv. 627, 631-35 (1963).07The court in Kardon also relied on contractual voidability under section
29(b), which provides that contracts in violation of any section of the Act shall
*be void. The court said: "[A] statutory enactment that a contract of a certain kind
shall be void almost necessarily implies a remedy in respect of it." 69 F .Supp. at
514. Private actions can be grounded on this contractual theory only if the parties
are in privity. Cf. 3 Loss 1759.8 E.g., Chow Bing Kew v. United States, 248 F.2d 466, 471 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 889 (1957); Shields v. State, 184 Okla. 618, 620-22, 89 P.2d
756, 760-61 (1939).
" Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415, 420 (2d Cir. 1961). The court also recog-
nized that "willful" would embrace "an act done with a bad purpose." Id.
"' Kelly v. Burtner, 310 Il. App. 251, 256, 33 N.E.2d 754, 757 (1941).
... See generally 2 Loss 1307-12; 5 Id. 3367-78 (1969).
102 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964).
10l 328 F.2d at 862. Alternatively, the court said: "[T]he government can meet
its burden by proving that a defendant deliberately closed his eyes to facts he had
a duty to see... ." Id.
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Keeton's categories' °4 as "willful." Other courts have gone even further,
bringing negligent misrepresentations within the term "willfully." Both
the Sixth'0 5 and Seventh Circuits'0 6 have held that the willfulness re-
quirement of the Securities Act is satisfied by proof that the defendant
made representations that due diligence would have shown to be un-
true. This interpretation has led Professor Ruder to state that "this
burden [proof of willfulness] will easily be met"107 and a student author
to write that "willfulness might be simply an alternative way of de-
scribing a negligence standard."1 08
D. Legislative and Administrative History
It is common when construing a statute that is ambiguous on its
face to refer to legislative history as an aid in determining legislative
intent.10 9 Although a number of courts, faced with questions concerning
the role of scienter in a private action under 10b-5, have discussed the
legislative history of section 10b and rule 10b-5,1 0 none has found any
guidance. In enacting section 10b, Congress did not consider the possi-
bility of private actions being maintained thereunder, much less the ele-
ments of such actions. Section 10b was enacted to give the newly created
Securities and Exchange Commission the power to regulate manipulative
practices so as to avoid loopholes in the law."' At the time of its enact-
ment, the provision was generally regarded as of little significance.
Similarly, the history of rule 10b-5 affords little insight. It too was
designed for use by the Securities and Exchange Commission, rather
than as a basis for private recovery. In fact, the Commission in drafting
10ll With respect to this and subsequent references Dean Keeton's five classes
of misrepresentation, see pp. 483-84 supra.2"0 See Stone v. United States, 113 F.2d 70, 75 (6th Cir. 1940).
100 See United States v. Schaefer, 299 F.2d 625, 629 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
370 U.S. 917 (1962), quoting Stone v. United States, 113 F.2d 70, 75 (6th Cir.
1940).107 Ruder, supra note 96, at 678 n.2 31.
10 Comment, Negligent Misrepresentations Under Ride 10b-5, 32 U. Curi. L.
REv. 824, 838 (1965).
... See generally 2 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 481-507 (3d
ed. 1943).
10See, e.g., Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); Trussell v. United
Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964).
... S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934). See Hearings on H.R. 7852
and H.R. 8720 (Stock Exchange Regulation) Before the House Conmm. on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934) (testimony of Thomas
G. Corcoran).
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and adopting rule 10b-5 was motivated by a specific incident-a corporate
officer was intentionally spreading erroneous harmful information about
his company so that he could purchase its outstanding stock at a greatly
reduced price. In the words of the Rule's draftsman:
... I looked at Section 10(b) and I looked at Section 17, and I put
them together, and the only discussion we had there was where "in
connection with the purchase or sale" should be ....
We called the Commission and we got on the calendar .... All
the commissioners read the rule and they tossed it on the table, indi-
cating approval. Nobody said anything except Sumner Pike who
said, "Well," he said, "we are against fraud, aren't we?" That is
how it happened.11 2
There was again little recognition of the significance of the action."'
In a release issued on the day of adoption, the SEC explained the pur-
pose and scope of the Rule as follows:
The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced the
adoption of a rule prohibiting fraud by any person in connection with
the purchase of securities. The previously existing rules against fraud
in the purchase of securities applied only to brokers and dealers. The
new rule closes a loophole in the protections against fraud administered
by the Commission by prohibiting individuals or companies from buying
securities if they engage in fraud in their purchase .... 11
Perhaps some significance can be attributed to the use of the word "fraud"
by both Commissioner Pike and the writer of the press release."-5 While
there is again the question of what is meant by "fraud," this phraseology
would seem to indicate that the Commission viewed rule 10b-5 as apply-
ing to, at most, misrepresentations within Classes Three, Four, and Five.
It is well to remember, however, that these observations were directed
to governmental use of the Rule."
"'Freeman, Administrative Procedures, 22 Bus. LAWYER 891, 922 (1967).
"' See BROMBERG § 2.2; Manne, In Defense of Insider Trading, 44 HARv. Bus.
REv. 113, 121 (Nov.-Dec. 1966).
"" SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942).
... The word "fraud" was also used in connection with rule 10b-5 in the Annual
Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission for the year of the Rule's
adoption. 8 SEC ANN. REP. 10 (1942).
... See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 3.75 U.S. 180, 193(1963); Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 914-15 (1961); Bromberg, Insider
Purchases, Sales and Tips, in PLI, TEXAs GULF SuLPnum-DscLosREs & Ix-
SIDERs 73 (1968).
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E. Significance of Other Sections of the Securities Acts
Still another cardinal rule of statutory construction is that an inter-
pretation making every section operative is favored over one that makes
some sections duplicative or unnecessary. 17 There are several provisions
in the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
aside from section 10b and rule 10b-5, that provide for or have been read
to provide for civil liability; there are also express statutory limitations
on actions brought under these sections." 8 Consequently, it can be argued
that unless these limitations are read into lOb-5 or unless liability under
the Rule is limited to intentional misrepresentations, these sections will
become surplusage since the plaintiff will always proceed under rule
lOb-5 to avoid the limitations. To appreciate this contention fully, it
becomes necessary to examine the sections referred to.
The Securities Act" 9 contains three sections that expressly provide
buyers of securities with a civil remedy for misrepresentation, and a fourth
that has been so read. Section 11120 imposes liability on "almost anyone
who had anything to do with a new issue"'' for false statements or
omissions in the prospectus. Neither scienter nor negligence is necessary
for the plaintiff's prima facie case under section 11 ; he need simply estab-
lish that he acquired securities whose registration statement contained a
material misstatement or omission. State of mind, however, may be
important to the defendant. Unless he is an issuer, he may avoid liability
for the "unexpertized" portion of the registration statement 22 by estab-
" [W]here the statute in question expressly created a private cause of
action, the implied cause.., must square with legislative intent at least to
the extent that the implied private cause of action does not have aspects in-
consistent with those provided in connection with the express cause.
Leavell, supra note 81, at 156.
18 See generally Simpson, Investors' Civil Remedies Under the Federal Securi-
ties Laws, 12 DPAUt L. REv. 71 (1962).
"'1 An analysis of the Securities Act of 1933 is in order since the Securities Act
and the Securities Exchange Act are generally regarded as being in part inateria.
See, e.g., 3 Loss 1781; Note, Securities Acts-Securities Act of 1933-B uyer
Relying on Misleading Prospectus May Recover Punitive Damages; Grossly
Negligent Underwriter Cannot Enforce Indemnification Agreement Against Issuer,
82 HARv. L. REv. 951, 954-59 (1969).
2 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1964).
... Note, The Prospects for Ride X-1OB-5: An Emerging Remedy for Defrauded
Investors, 59 YALE L.J. 1120, 1126 (1950). For a more extensive discussion of
liability under section 11, see Comment, Civil Liability for Misstatements in Docu-
-ments Filed Under Securities Act and Securities Exchange Act, 44 YALE L.J.
456, 470-76 (1935).
..2 For the "expertized" portion of the registration statement-that part certi-
fied by an expert such as an accountant-the defendant need establish only that
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lishing that he had "reasonable ground to believe and did believe" that
the statement in issue was true or that there was no omission of a material
fact; the standard of reasonableness is statutorily defined as that required
of a prudent man in the management of his own property. In terms of
Dean Keeton's classifications, by bringing himself within Classes One or
Two, the defendant avoids liability.
Section 12(2)123 also provides relief for misstatements and omissions,
but unlike section 11, the misstatements or omissions need not have
occurred in the registration statement; they may be in any oral communica-
tion or prospectus.'24 As with section 11, scienter and negligence are a
part of the defendant's case; by establishing that he did not know and
in the exercise of "reasonable care" could not have known of the mis-
representation or omission, the defendant may avoid liability. 2 5 Again,
by bringing himself within Classes One or Two, the defendant is protected.
If an action is brought under either section 11 or section 12(2), the
court in its discretion may require the plaintiff to post a bond for the
payment of costs, including attorneys fees, in the event that the suit is
found to be lacking merit.'26 The plaintiff under section 11 or 12(2)
must allege facts establishing that the action has been brought within one
year after the discovery of the omission or after such discovery should
have been made by the exercise of reasonable diligence. 12  There are
also venue limitations on private actions brought under section 11 or
section 12(2) ; such actions must be instituted in the district in which
the defendant is found, is an inhabitant, or transacts business or in the
district in which the sale took place if the defendant participated in it.128
Section 15129 imposes liability on one who controls, through stock
"he had no reasonable ground to believe and did not believe . . .that the state-
ments . . .were untrue .... ." 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1964).
22 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1964).
"Prospectus" is defined in section 2(10) of the Securities Act include virtu-
ally every written communication.
12' The interpretation of this provision affords further illustration of the division
over the meaning of scienter. Professor Loss has taken the position that scienter is
"foreign" to section 12(2) while a Michigan notewriter has written: "This lan-
gauge incorporates ... scienter into a section 12(2) action, but as an affirmative
defense." Compare 3 Loss 1730 with Note, Proof of Scienter Necessary in a
Private Suit Under SEC Anti-Fraud Rile 10b-5, 63 Micn. L. REv. 1070, 1074
(1965).
12 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1964).
127 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1964). But in no event shall an action be allowed more
than three years after sale or initial offering.
128 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1964). Actions may also be brought in state tribunals.
12015 U.S.C. § 77o (1964).
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ownership, agency, or otherwise, a person liable under section 11 or 12.
The venue and costs provisions applicable to sections 11 and 12 also
apply to section 15.130 Again, the defendant has the burden of proving
his state of mind-proof of "no knowledge of or reasonable ground to
believe in" the existence of the facts giving rise to the asserted liability
constitutes a defense. This standard seems more favorable to the de-
fendant than those in sections 11 and 12. In terms of Dean Keeton's
classifications, only those persons in Classes Four or Five would seem to
be vulnerable under section 15.
Some courts have recognized a private right of action in a buyer
for misrepresentations under section 17.13l Section 17 is worded virtually
the same as rule 10b-5; the rule was, in effect, copied from it.' 32 It would
thus seem that the scienter requirements under section 17 should be the
same as under rule lOb-5, and several courts have taken this position.1
33
Accordingly, there will be no separate discussion of this section.
Remedies under the Securities Exchange Act, unlike those under the
Securities Act, are available to both buyers and sellers. Like the Securities
Act, the Securities Exchange Act contains three sections that expressly
provide for civil liability for misrepresentation and, again, a fourth that
has been so read.
Section 9 of the Act contains a number of specific prohibitions against
the manipulation of securities registered on a national exchange. One
such prohibition goes to a false and misleading statement that the mis-
representer "knew or had reasonable grounds to believe was false or
misleading."' 1 4 This standard seemingly encompasses only Classes Four
13" There is, however, some question as to the applicable statute of limitations.
Section 13, the-limitations provision of the 1933 Act, speaks only of sections 11
and 12. It can, however, be argued that since liability under section 15 extends only
"to the same extent as" liability under sections 11 and 12, section 13 also applies
to section 15.1
"'E.g., Thiele v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Osborne v.
Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). Contra, Trussell v. United Under-
writers, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 769 (D. Colo. 1964). Professor Loss has made
a telling argument against implying a private action under section 17 by pointing
out that the Securities Act is replete with express remedies for the same activities.
3 Loss 1784-90. Nevertheless, this controversy seems of limited practical sig-
nificance in light of the implied private remedy under rule 10b-5.
18 See p. 497 & note 112 supra.
.E.g., Fischman v. Ratheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 787 n.2 (2d Cir. 1951)
(dictum); Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
...15 U.S.C. §78i(a)(4) (1964).
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and Five ;135 it cannot be said that a person with no knowledge of the
accuracy or inaccuracy of his statement has reasonable grounds to believe
that the statement is false. Section 9(e), however, limits civil liability
for violation of the section to persons who "willfully" violate its mandates.
It could be argued from this limitation that the potential defendants are
limited to those within Class Five.Y6 Defenses are available that limit the
applicability of section 9 even further; not only are there venue and costs
limitations similar to those under sections 11 and 12(2) of the Securities
Act, but there is also a severe causation burden.137
Section 18"88 provides for civil liability for misleading statements of
material facts in papers filed under the Securities Exchange Act or any
rule thereunder. As in sections 11 and 12(2) of the Securities Act, the
defendant has the burden of proving his state of mind as a defense. A
defendant in an action under section 18 may avoid liability by establishing
that he acted in good faith and without knowledge of the falsity or mis-
leading nature of the statement. This standard has been generally con-
sidered as being very favorable to the defendant-much less stringent than,
for example, section 11 of the 1933 Act. 39 Such a view, however, seems
to focus only on the requirement of knowledge and to ignore the phrase
"in good faith." Defendants within Classes Three and Four as well as
those in Class Five are not "in good faith" and accordingly can not
utilize this defense.
Section 20'° is the Securities Exchange Act counterpart of section 15
of the Securities Act; it imposes liability on anyone who controls a
person liable under any of the provisions of the 1934 Act. The defenses
available to the defendants, however, are stated in terms different from
those of section 15-"good faith" as contrasted with "knowledge of or
reasonable grounds to believe." Although, for reasons mentioned above,
the former would seem to protect only defendants in Classes One and
... Professor Schulman apparently would limit it even further-to Class Five
only. In referring to this language in section 9, he has written: "This 'scienter'
requirement is a strict one and goes far beyond the more modem concepts applied
in misrepresentation cases"' Schulman, Statutes of Limitation in 10b-5 Actions:
Complication Added to Confusion, 13 WAYNE L. REv. 635, 646 (1967).
. Compare pp. 494-95 & notes 96-97 supra.
See generally 3 Loss 1748-49.
15 U.S.C. §78r (1964).
'a' 3 Loss 1752 ("cousin to scienter"); Comment, Civil Liability for Misstate-
ments in Documents Filed Under Securities Act and Securities Exchange Act, 44
YALE L.J. 456, 474 (1935) ("may enable the negligent or even the intentionally
dishonest director or officer to escape liability entirely").1 ,015 U.S.C. § 78t (1964).
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Two and the latter defendants in Classes One through Three, the absence
of case law under these sections precludes any certainty as to the practical
differences between the two standards.'
Civil liability for misrepresentation has been implied from section
15(c) (1)142 of the Securities Exchange Act-the anti-fraud provision
applicable to over-the-counter transactions involving brokers or dealers.143
Aside from the language limiting it to over-the-counter transactions by
brokers or dealers, the wording of 15(c) (1) is markedly similar to that
of section 10b. In addition, rule 15c(1-2), promulgated under section
15(c) (1), defines fraudulent practices in a manner similar in part to
10b-5 (b) except that the misstatement must be made "with knowledge
or reasonable grounds to believe that it is untrue or misleading.1 44 Un-
like sections 11 and 12(2) of the Securities Act and section 18 of the
Securities Exchange Act, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff; he must
establish that the defendant comes within Classes Four or Five.
There is no statutory basis for applying any of the restrictions in
the above provisions to rule lOb-5.'45 One example is the statute of
limitations. 46 While a number of writers have urged that the statute
of limitations of the Securities Act of 1933 should be implied in private
actions brought under rule 10b-5,14T no court to date has so held. Such
a holding would ignore the statutory framework. Rule lob-5 was promul-
gated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which contains several
limitations provisions. This fact would seem to preclude application of
the 1933 Act's limitations to the Rule. On the other hand, the Securities
Exchange Act's statutes of limitations are also not applicable; they are
all directed to particular sections of the Act-sections other than section
10b.
141 Professor Loss indicates that the standards are different but does not state
the nature of the difference. 3 Loss 1808.12 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (1) (1964).
'"See, e.g., Opper v. Hancock Securities Corp., 250 F. Supp. 668, 673
(S.D.N.Y.) (dictum), aff'd per curiam, 367 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1966). See also
E. GADSBY, FEDERAL SECURITIES EXc~rANGE ACT § 5.03(2), at 5-31 (1967).
'" "This is a version of scienter ... ." BROMBERG §2.3, at 23.
"'See Comment, Negligent Misrepresentations Under Ride 10b-5, 32 U. CuI.
L. REv. 824, 836 n.49 (1965).
"' "[T]he main reason for bringing an action under section l0b and Rule
10b-5 may be to avoid the relatively short statute of limitations provided for in
the express civil liability sections of the 1933 and 1934 Acts." H. SOWARDS,
SECURITIES REGULATIONS 436 (1966).
...See BROMBERG § 12.9, at 284; Israels, supra note 57, at 1591; Schulman,
supra note 135; Note, Civil Liability Under Section lOB and Ride 10b-5: A Sug-
gestion for Replacing the Doctrine of Privity, 74 YALE L.J. 658, 685-86 (1965).
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Accordingly, a plaintiff can avoid the obstacles presented by other
potentially applicable provisions of the Securities Act and the Se-
curities Exchange Act by proceeding under rule 10b-5, and this is
precisely what plaintiffs are doing.14 Professor Bromberg has approxi-
mated that rule lOb-5 is "generating almost as much litigation as all the
other general antifraud provisions together, and several times as much
as the express liabilities," 149 and has stated:
[Rule 10b-5] is by now such a dominant factor in private securities
litigation that one is surprised when it does not turn up, and a court
does not hesitate to introduce it as a major consideration if plaintiff
fails to plead it.15 0
IV. CONCLUSION
While principles of statutory construction do not definitely establish
which misrepresentations should be within the ambit of rule 10b-5, they
do indicate which misrepresentations should not: those innocently made.
Although actions based on intentional and negligent misrepresentations
are consistent with the above considerations, actions based on innocent
misrepresentations are not.
This conclusion is also supported by the policy underlying the federal
securities legislation. The probable result of imposing liability under rule
10b-5 for innocent misrepresentations would be a drastic reduction of
information to the public regarding traded securities; the basic purpose
of the federal securities laws is to statutorily encourage and increase the
dissemination of information pertaining to securities.1 51 Thus it wouldt
be incongruous to extend rule 10b-5's coverage to innocent misrepresenta-
tions.
The question remains, however, whether rule 10b-5 reaches negligent
as well as intentional misrepresentations-whether Classes Two through
Five should all be actionable under the Rule. Constructional principles
do not provide an answer. On balance, they indicate that such a reading of
rule 10b-5 is permissible; however, they afford no guidance as to the
policies that support such an interpretation. The desirability of subjecting
negligent misrepresentations to liability under rule 10b-5 would seem to
call for consideration by the SEC of the effects of such action on the
flow of information to the public regarding securities. Attention should
148 Schulman, suepra note 135, at 644.
BROMBERG § 2.5(6), at 45-46.
180 Id. 46.
See It re Tucker Corp., 26 S.E.C. 249 (1947). The preamble to the Securi-
ties Act reads in part: "To provide full and fair disclosure ......
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be given to the quality as well as the quantity of such information.
Obviously, the easier it is to establish liability for misrepresentations under
the Rule, the more careful a representer will be in what he states, and the
higher will be the quality of the information that is disseminated; equally
obvious, the harder it is to establish liability for misrepresentations, the
freer will be the flow of information although its quality or accuracy
may suffer.
These conflicting goals present a question of policy that the SEC is
best equipped to handle. 5 ' It is unrealistic to expect a legislative solution
in the near future. 5 ' The same is true of a judicial solution. Some of
the federal judicial circuits have yet to consider a private action under
rule 10b-5; and in SEC v. National Securities, Inc.,' 4 the Supreme Court
said:
Although § 10b and Rule lOb-5 may well be the most litigated pro-
visions in the federal securities laws, this is the first time this Court
has found it necessary to interpret them. We enter this virgin
territory cautiously. The questions presented are narrow ones. They
arise in an area where glib generalizations and unthinking abstractions
are major occupational hazards. Accordingly, in deciding this par-
ticular case, remembering what is not involved is as important as
determining what is.15r
Heeding the Court's admonition, no further "glib generalizations"
will be made. Rather, SEC action in this area is again urged. As
one of the nation's leading securities lawyers has observed: "[I]f the
law were clearer and lOb-5 had been written out in some kind of a specific
regulation and I think it is possible-I don't think Texas Gulf could
have happened."' 15
1 2 See generally 1 K. DAVIs, AD NISTRATIVE LAvW TREATi S § 1.05 (1958).
But cf. Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The Second Round: Privily and State of
Mind in Rule 10b-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 423, 450 (1968)
("each case involves separate considerations which no longer lend themselves to
sweeping statements regarding the elements required for imposition of liability
under Rule 10b-5").
'1 See e.g., Demmler, Codification, 22 Bus. LAWYER 832, 840 (1967); Israels,
supra note 57. It should be noted that Professor Loss has recently undertaken the
task of recodifying federal securities laws for the American Law Institute.
"'393 U.S. 453 (1969).
... Id. at 465. This language would seem to render impractical Professor Ruder's
proposal discussed at p. 490 supra. The variable factors in Ruder's plan necessitate
a judicial rather than an administrative implementation.
.. Panel Discussion--The Emergence of Federal Corporation Law and Federal
Cotnrol of Inside Information, 34 U.M.K.C.L. Rnv. 228, 232 (1966) (remarks of
Neil Kennedy).
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